AGENTS AND ADVISORS
Deborah A. DeMott*
Like advisors, agents pose challenges for scholarly accounts of
fiduciary obligation. Neither fits well within definitions of fiduciary
status that turn on whether an actor has discretionary authority over the
legal or practical interests of another, which would trigger a fiduciary’s
distinctive duties of care and loyalty. In particular, providing advice does
not necessarily run in tandem with the power to bind its recipient to
transactions corresponding to the advice; an agency relationship situates
the agent as subject to the principal’s control, which seems discordant
with possessing discretionary authority.
Separately, neither an advisor nor an agent serves as a substitute for
the advisee or the principal. When the assumed prototype for a fiduciary
relationship is a trust, an ownership structure in which the trustee—who
serves as a substitute for the settlor in dealing with trust property—owes
duties to the trust’s beneficiaries,1 neither agents nor advisors fit the
fiduciary category. An agent, empowered to take action that affects the
principal’s legal relations, serves as an extension of the principal’s legal
personality; an advisor’s function is enhancing the quality of judgments
made by the advisee, not substituting for the advisee in making
judgments. As a consequence, dominant academic accounts cast agents
as interlopers in the fiduciary realm, notwithstanding long-established
doctrine establishing that agents are fiduciaries as a categorical matter
regardless of a given relationship’s factual specifics.2 And the trust
prototype daunts the law’s more complex treatment of advisors, who can
owe fiduciary duties depending on the context in which advice is given
and other specifics of the parties’ relationship, not on the ex-ante
assignment of an actor to a particular category.3
In a recent article, Advisors as Fiduciaries, Professor Arthur Laby
examines the roles of advisors in multiple contexts and elaborates
justifications for whether and when advice-giving does (and should)
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1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. L. INST. 2003) (defining “trust” as “a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to create
that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it
for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee”).
2. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW [hereinafter FIDUCIARY LAW HANDBOOK] 449, 460–61 (Evan J. Criddle et al.
eds., 2019) (This work contrasts remedies in agency law with other fiduciary categories. “[T]he
Restatement (Third) of Agency speaks the language of fiduciary duties, yet those duties do not
shape the available remedies to the same extent as in trust law and in fiduciary law more
generally.”).
3. See Daniel Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relations, in
FIDUCIARY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 4.
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trigger the imposition of a suite of distinctively fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty.4 Professor Laby’s article is a major intervention in fiduciarylaw scholarship because it examines in depth the justifications for
fiduciary status and articulates why many advisors are treated as
fiduciaries.5 As this Response explains, Professor Laby’s intervention
turns on re-situating questions about the fiduciary status of advisors into
a framework that focuses on an advisor’s activity and relationships with
clients, not a priori (or taxonomic) categories that turn on the possession
of discretionary authority over another’s assets or interests more
generally.6 Beyond academic theory, Professor Laby’s article has
practical implications because it helps to clarify analysis in a category of
cases where courts have not reached consensus.7 Moreover, the stakes are
significant. Advising is a common-place activity integral to many
professions and pervasive in day-to-day life. Additionally, the remedies
available for breach of a fiduciary duty are distinctive.8 Gain-based
remedies are tightly linked to the fiduciary duty of loyalty,9 underscoring
for advisors the importance of avoiding or disclosing conflicts between
the advice given and the advisor’s own interests.10
Professor Laby’s article is also a springboard for reflection on agency
law, a long-standing misfit within a fiduciary realm dominated by trustlaw prototypes and inquiry into whether an actor possesses discretionary
authority.11 As Professor Laby points out, many years ago I identified the
possession of discretion as a common theme in accounts of fiduciary
obligation.12 My perspective now is grounded in the implications of
agency law for fiduciary theory. This Response begins by identifying the
analytic steps that undergird Professor Laby’s sophisticated and
comprehensive account of advisors. The Response then explores the
implications of agency law’s persistence as a fiduciary category in light
of Professor Laby’s account of advisors. A brief conclusion highlights
why and how these questions matter.
Many theoretical accounts of fiduciary law—unlike Professor
4.
(2020).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Arthur B. Laby, Advisors as Fiduciaries, 72 FLA. L. REV. 953, 959–60, 964–75

See id. at 957.
See id. at 957–58.
Id. at 956 & n.2 (noting split among courts concerning advisors’ fiduciary status).
Id. at 957.
Bray, supra note 2, at 452.
Laby, supra note 4, at 1011.
Or, if not a misfit, a special snowflake. See Evan J. Criddle et al., Introduction, in
FIDUCIARY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at ix, xxi (volume’s treatment “explains how agency
law has incorporated fiduciary principles in idiosyncratic ways that reflect the principal’s power
to direct and supervise the agent and the agent’s power to bind the principal”).
12. Laby, supra note 4, at 981 (discussing Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (1988)).
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Laby’s—use a framework that focuses on types of actors and their status,
determined as an initial matter in taxonomic fashion. In contrast,
Professor Laby’s inquiry into advisors initially focuses on activity and its
consequences: advisors seek trust from their advisees by inviting them to
repose trust, leading to reliance and vulnerability.13 The fiduciary duty
for advisors “grows out of the nature of the trust relationship,” with the
objective of preventing harm that can stem from misplaced trust as well
as furnishing a distinctive set of remedies when trust is betrayed.14 Also
crucial to Professor Laby’s account is that the context in which the
activity of advising occurs serves to designate clear cases in which an
advisor owes a fiduciary duty, such as lawyers who advise clients but do
not have discretionary authority over their assets.15 In many clear cases,
advisors, like lawyers who are characterized as fiduciaries, are
professionals; they give advice as an essential component of an expert
service, for which, one way or another, they receive compensation.
As Professor Laby acknowledges, advice-giving by itself does not
necessarily trigger fiduciary consequences.16 Context matters to explain,
for example, why registered investment advisors owe fiduciary duties but
car mechanics typically do not. Only rarely would advising be the
dominant point of hiring a mechanic or serve as the primary basis for
compensation; and most mechanics do not hold themselves out as
advisors as opposed to skilled providers of non-advisory services. The
stakes are also relevant in defining context. For most people, advice
concerning vehicle repairs carries lower stakes than financial advice
about life savings, which feature more prominently in clients’ overall
financial stories. And the remedial consequences when an advisor
breaches a fiduciary duty may matter, at least implicitly, in assessing the
advisor’s status. A car mechanic may well give advice that is conflicted—
for example, to repair an older vehicle that does not warrant it—but the
conflict and its ramifications are likely to be more evident than advice
given in the context of investing in financial products and investment
strategies.
To be sure, as fiduciary-law scholarship has deepened over the years,
canonical accounts encompass cases in which courts analyze particular
facts and circumstances to determine, on an ad hoc basis, whether to
characterize a particular relationship as fiduciary. In Daniel Kelly’s
assessment of ad-hoc fiduciaries, they include instances in which a
financial advisor “cultivates a relationship of trust,” having held out
expertise, to an “inexperienced [client who] relies on her advice and

13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 958.
Laby, supra note 4, at 956.
Id. at 973–74.
Id. at 958.
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reposes complete trust in” the advisor.17 To be sure, advisees’ experience
is not a binary concept; it varies across a spectrum. An advisor may owe
fiduciary duties to an advisee who is not completely inexperienced in
business or investing, in particular when the advisor has superior
knowledge and expertise about complex transactions configured by the
advisor that generate substantial and undisclosed conflicts of interest.18
Professor Laby also notes that courts often determine whether an advisor
should be deemed an ad hoc fiduciary “against a backdrop dominated by
status-based fiduciaries,”19 in which some advisors—like lawyers and
trustees—occupy a defined role from which fiduciary status follows
without inquiry into specifics of a relationship.20
Might the fact that some advisors will always be treated as fiduciaries
“lead other advisees to assume that advice giving, even if done by
someone who is not a status-based fiduciary, is a fiduciary enterprise?”21
Professor Laby characterizes this as a “spillover effect” that may shape
advisees’ expectations “as an empirical matter,” but should not operate
as “an independent reason to impose a fiduciary duty” on advisors who
are not status-based fiduciaries.22 But agency-law doctrine suggests such
a reason when an advisor has constructed an appearance that shapes
advisees’ reasonable expectations. The doctrine of apparent authority is
the most prominent doctrine in agency law that ascribes legal significance
to the creation of appearances, which occurs when a manifestation by a
principal that an agent has authority to act on the principal’s behalf23
shapes the understanding and thus the reasonable behavior of third
parties. Agency-law doctrines respond to third-party risks created
through constructed appearances of authority or of agency itself.24 In
particular, through the constructed appearance of an agent’s authority, a
principal can entice a third party to commit to a transaction within the
scope of the agent’s apparent authority, while reserving the option of later
17. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 3, 4.
18. See Bamford v. Penfold, 2020 WL 967942, at *2–3, *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2020)
(defendant served as business and financial advisor to plaintiff, his close friend for decades whose
sophistication did not extend to complex business structures and tax-related issues; defendant,
inter alia, did not disclose related-party transactions with business entity in which plaintiff
invested, including those facilitated by reorganization of entity). In Bamford, the court held that
the complaint’s allegations of a “deep and intimate friendship” were “sufficiently strong to
contribute to an inference of a fiduciary relationship,” detailing that the defendant “exercised
control over significant assets and oversaw [the plaintiff’s] personal finances,” and the plaintiff
“trusted and relied on” the defendant, “who had superior knowledge and expertise,” all in “the
context of a close and intimate friendship that reached a familial level.” Id. at *11.
19. Laby, supra note 4, at 998.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 999.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.03 & 3.03 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
24. Id.
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disavowing the transaction, to the principal’s advantage but the third
party’s disadvantage, although the third party reasonably believed the
appearance to be true and acted accordingly.25 Likewise, an advisor who
engenders advisees’ expectations of loyalty by positioning her services
as comparable to those of status-based fiduciaries – knowing (or hoping)
that advisees are likely to believe her construction of an apparent
“fiduciary enterprise”—furnishes a reason to hold her to the
consequences of that constructed appearance.
Finally, in Professor Laby’s account, the texture of the parties’
relationship over time matters.26 The relationship between two parties
may evolve from a non-fiduciary relationship to a fiduciary one, with the
provision of advice serving as a trigger.27 Likewise, seeking and
obtaining trust, an essential component of advisory relationships in
Professor Laby’s account,28 may occur quickly or more gradually. One
implication Professor Laby leaves largely unexplored is whether
evolution operates in only one direction. That is, if an advisee becomes
skeptical about an advisor, at some point might their relationship lose its
fiduciary dimension? A client might manifest lessened trust through
additional inquiries to the advisor, lessened compliance with the advice,
or enhanced monitoring, among other possibilities. As Professor Laby
notes, “[t]rust is not all or nothing,”29 and a client who, despite
skepticism, follows an advisor’s recommendation necessarily reposes
enough trust in the advisor to comply with the advice.
Professor Laby’s challenge to the view that only actors who possess
discretionary authority are subject to fiduciary duties30 also carries
implications for agents and agency law. In contrast to the unsettled or
context-dependent status of advisors, authoritative accounts of agency
law characterize agents as fiduciaries and treat an agent’s fiduciary status
as a central feature in an agency relationship.31 Writing in 1889 in a still25. For a fuller account, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Platform as Agent, in
INTERMEDIARIES IN COMMERCIAL LAW (Paul S. Davies & Tan Cheng-Han, eds.) (forthcoming
Sep. 2022). More broadly, agency doctrine is alert to the multiple ways in which principal and
agent may collude with each other to the disadvantage of third parties. See George M. Cohen, Law
and Economics of Agency and Partnership, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
399, 403 (Francisco Parisi ed., 2017).
26. See Laby, supra note 4, at 957.
27. Id. at 975.
28. Id. at 956.
29. Id. at 1005, n.349.
30. Id. at 957.
31. The successive Restatements of Agency reflect the uncontroversial proposition that
agents serve as fiduciaries. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 13 (AM. L. INST. 1933) (“An agent is a
fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1(1) (AM. L. INST. 1958) (“Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM.
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influential account of agency law in the United States, Floyd R. Mechem
observed that “[r]eliance upon the agent’s integrity, fidelity and capacity
is the moving consideration in the creation of all agencies . . . .”32 Of
course, agents with power to bind their principals to transactions appear
to satisfy—at least most of the time—the conventional requisite for
fiduciary status. This is because such an agent possesses discretionary
authority either through the control of the principal’s property33 or power
over the principal’s affairs,34 and thus the power35 “to change the
principal’s legal or practical position.”36
But given the range of agency relationships, the issue is not so simple.
In particular, what does “discretion” require? Suppose the principal
confers authority on the agent in terms that leave the agent no choice
about what to do, for example, through precise specifics about the terms
of the transaction the principal desires. Does the agent possess
“discretion” as required by dominant academic accounts of fiduciary
law? Although the principal has not authorized the agent to make any
choice on the principal’s behalf, what the agent does, in compliance with
the principal’s instructions, will affect the principal’s legal relations by
binding the principal to a transaction with a third party.
Why might it matter whether the agent is a fiduciary? The agent might
perfectly execute the principal’s instructions but additionally (and
without the principal’s consent) self-deal or otherwise obtain personal
benefit in connection with the transaction, perhaps by front-running the
transaction executed for the principal with a transaction on the agent’s
own behalf.37 Or the agent might fail to inform the principal that the third
party is willing to deal on more advantageous terms, induced to silence

L. INST. 2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf
and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act.”).
32. 1 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 454, at 300 (1889).
33. Laby, supra note 4, at 979.
34. Id.
35. In the agency context, “power” is preferable to “authority” because it encompasses an
agent who commits the principal to a third party via apparent authority, not actual authority. As
between principal and agent, an act that binds the principal to a third party via only apparent
authority constitutes a straightforward breach of the agent’s duty to act only within the scope of
actual authority. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006). The agent has
a duty to indemnify the principal against any loss suffered by the principal as a consequence. Id.
cmt. b.
36. Laby, supra note 4, at 979–80.
37. See, e.g., Brandeis Brokers Ltd. v. Black, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 359 (QB) (Eng.)
(treating front- running as a breach of fiduciary obligation; broker in metals futures front-ran
clients’ orders, then later allocated purchase to itself or to client at its election with knowledge of
subsequent movements in market).
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by payment from the third party.38 The agent’s duty to account for the
benefits obtained through side dealings or other departures from loyalty
stem from the agent’s fiduciary status and the distinctive remedies
associated with breach; it’s no defense to the agent that the transaction
conducted on the principal’s behalf complied with the principal’s
instructions.39
Long-settled agency law treats these examples (and many others) as
easy examples of an agent’s breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. This
disjunction between decisional law and theory requires rethinking what
“discretion” means in this context. Perhaps discretion requires not that an
agent be empowered to choose among transactional alternatives on the
principal’s behalf but only—and consistently with a dictionary definition
of ‘discretion’—that the agent have “the freedom to decide on a course
of action.”40 The agent possessed “agency” as a person with capacity to
assert control over the agent’s own decisions,41 or freedom to decide what
to do, albeit disloyally to the principal. Acting as an extension of the
principal’s legal personality,42 the agent should act consistently with a
reasonable belief of what the principal wishes for the agent to do, which
would not be true of disloyal conduct. The consequences for the principal
of consenting to a legally-consequential extension of the principal’s
personality—including imputed knowledge of facts known to the agent
and material to the agency relationship—justifies treating an agent as a
fiduciary, distinct from questions about the agent’s possession of
discretion.
Moreover, the definitional requisites for any agency relationship fit
uneasily into conventional accounts of fiduciary relationships because,
however defined, an agent’s discretion co-exists with and may be
overshadowed by the principal’s power to control the agent. As Samuel
Bray writes of agency relationships, throughout their duration “the
principal tends to be present, uncowed, and able to assert control.”43 The
implications of this structural property may conflict with positing that an
agent has meaningful discretion, overshadowed as its exercise would
always be by the principal’s ongoing capacity to exercise control.
Relatedly, in common-law agency doctrine, when a principal loses legal
capacity to do an act, the agent loses actual authority to do the act,
underscoring how central the principal’s capacity for control is to the
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, illus. 3 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
39. Id. § 8.01, cmt. b.
40. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 410 (11th ed. 2008) (defining ‘discretion’ as
“1. the quality of being discreet. 2. the freedom to decide on a course of action”).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006) (discussing varied
meanings of ‘agency’ in the law, philosophical and literary studies, and economics).
42. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in FIDUCIARY LAW HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, at 24.
43. Bray, supra note 2, at 461.
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ongoing existence of an agency relationship.44 Of course, although a
principal has an ongoing capacity to control an agent, including the power
to give interim instructions to the agent, slippage occurs. Put differently,
possessing the capacity to control does not mean that control will be
exercised, exercised perfectly, or exercised in time to prevent misconduct
by the agent.
Professor Laby’s fine article concludes with the observation that “the
discretionary authority view of the fiduciary relationship . . . is not
universally valid.”45 That view is inadequate to explain why many
advisors who lack discretion over their clients’ assets are appropriately
treated as their advisees’ fiduciaries. And the discretionary authority view
carries potential to mislead courts away from focusing on signal aspects
of an advisor’s activity, including whether the advice-giving was primary
to the advisor’s role and whether the advisor held out or represented itself
as a source of expert advice. This Response illustrates additional
infirmities of the discretionary authority account as applied to commonlaw agents. Centering the requisites for a fiduciary relationship on the
possession of discretionary authority can call into question whether
agents are fiduciaries, notwithstanding agency’s long (if distinctive)
place in the fiduciary canon. This further discrepancy between academic
theory and the law furnishes an additional reason to rethink the theory.

44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.08(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006). In the Third
Restatement, but not its predecessors, termination for this reason is effective only when the agent
has notice of the principal’s loss of capacity; the termination is effective as against a third party
only when the third party has notice. See id. cmt. b (noting that most recent cases reject prior rule,
which treated a principal’s loss of capacity as an event that automatically terminated an agent’s
authority, regardless of whether an agent or a third party had notice).
45. Laby, supra note 4, at 1021.

